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Philosophical Issues in Cosmology, Quantum Theory, and Time
Rutgers, April 1518, 2010
Valia Allori
Comments on Alyssa Ney's “The Status of Ordinary ThreeDimensional Space in Realist Quantum
Mechanics”
Alyssa's paper discusses the success of various possible ontologies for quantum mechanics in
explaining certain features of our manifest image, given the scientific image of quantum theory. In
particular, she focuses on the success in explaining the perception of the threedimensionality of space.
There are two main ontological alternatives: the wave function ontology, and the primitive ontology.
According to the former, everything there is is described by the wave function in configuration space;
the latter instead claims that matter is described by some other entity in threedimensional space or in
fourdimensional spacetime. Alyssa argues that, for different reasons, both alternatives fail in providing
a satisfactory explanations of our manifest image. I respectfully disagree. In order to explain why, let
me go through her arguments one after the other.
There are four arguments in her paper: the first is an argument for the indispensability of the wave
function based on entangled states. Very roughly, the idea is that the only way of explaining the
existence of entangled states is to postulate the existence of the wave function. Alyssa thinks this
argument is establishing that we cannot really say that there is no wave function. I think that there is a
sense in which is true, and one in which is not. It is not true that the wave necessarily has to describe
physical objects, while I think it is true in the sense that there has to be some object in the theory that
will be able to account for such states. The argument is based on the premise that there are entangled
states, and that these states describe physical stuff. But that is not necessarily the case. The entangled
states are states about the wave function: it is the wave function that is in superposition. So, only if one
is wave function realist entangled states are states of matter, while the primitive ontology (representing
matter) is never in superposition. That is, observing that there are entangled states only shows that there
has to something in the theory that accounts for them (Ψ), but that does not necessarily mean that this
object has to represent physical reality: indeed, this is exactly what the primitive ontologists are
denying. This is their way to solve the measurement problem. In fact, consider Bohmian mechanics: the
wave function is in deathlife superposition, but the cat is made of particles, and it is never both dead
and alive. Her particles are either in the support of the “dead” wave function or in the “live” one, and it
is very unlikely that if they are in the dead sector their position will move back in the alive one. So, to
sum up, the argument form entangled states does not prove the wave function has to “physically” exist.
Be that as it may, Alyssa continues: if the wave function exists, it lives in a very high dimensional state
(configuration state). As such, she says, the configuration space should not really be called that way,
since configurations suggests that there are particles, and this is not true. And the problem here is that
alone configuration space has no resources to recover three—dimensional space for the wave function
realist. I think there is not much controversy here: this has been already pointed out by many people,not
only by opponents of wave function realists like myself, Nino, Shelly, and Tim, but also by the very
proponents of wave function realism like David and Barry themselves (that is why David introduces the
Hamiltonia rule).
So the next step Alyssa take is to analyze the possible options, the first being the one based on primitive
ontology. She finds the view unsatisfactory in the characterization (“what are you talking about?”) and

in the motivation (“why go that way?”) . I will try to make a little bit of clarity here.
Indeed, there has been a lot of problems in the understanding what this view says because of the
locution”primitive”. I do not think one should be confused by language, so for the moment let us forget
for a moment this name, and let us try to understand what the view really say (or at least this is how I
see it) regardless on how one decoded to call things.
The main idea is that the wave function does not represent matter, some other object in 3dimensional
space does. The reason why the wave function does not represent matter is simply that it does not live
in the “right” space. The “right” space here means the space of the manifest image: we all believe that
physical space is 3dimensional, and this is exactly what we should continue to believe. Why? Because
it worked for us in the past (see other fundamental physical theories), and there is no reason why we
cannot do it also here. There is nothing that forces us to accept the wave function as composing matter
(as I was explaining earlier discussing Alyssa's first argument). Indeed, if we do insist in considering
the wave function as representing material objects then we have the problem of “recovering” 3
dimensional space. If instead we start from a scientific image based on 3dimensional objects, then we
have no problem whatsoever (at least we have no additional difficulties than the difficulties that we
might have in classical mechanics) in recovering the manifest image.
Alyssa thinks that this view is “less straightforward” in the sense that originally in quantum mechanics
we just had Schroedinger's equation that is about the wave function, and this is the main reason why we
should think the theory is about the wave function. I don't think that is true: even if that what is was
originally, the measurement problem suggested that we should revise that idea. In fact if we insist in
claiming that the wave function represents matter, we have the dead and alive cat, and we would have to
struggle to reconcile the manifest with the scientific image. So which one of the two is more
straightforward? Assume that all there is is wave function and come up with some complicated theory
to account for the manifest image, or realize that the wave function does not constitute matter,
something else does, and continue using the same reductionist machinery we used already in classical
mechanics? Which one is more scientifically conservative?
In other words then, for the primitive ontologists there is nothing to reconcile between the scientific and
the manifest image at the level of fundamental space, there is no recovery of threedimensional space
since this is right there from the beginning as the fundamental space of the theory. The explanation
that the theory provides is far more direct and transparent than the one provided by the wave function
realist. This seems to be a very good to me to depart from what Alyssa calls the “most straightforward
reading” of quantum mechanics, a reading that I would call, using Rodi's terminology, “the most
romantic reading” of quantum mechanics.
This is what I have to say about motivation. I have said already something about the characterization,
but I did not actually finish: the status of the wave function in the theory remained a little mysterious.
And therefore now I cannot avoid talking about the primitivenonprimitive distinction. We primitive
ontologists are not saying that the wave function does not exists. It does, but it is not primitive. That
means that the wave function does not represent physical stuff, but it is part of the theory nonetheless, it
is the nomological component, it is what tells mater how to move. So, it is not primitive in the sense
that it is not representing objects, while it is governing their behavior: it would not make such sense to
talk about the wave function alone if not in terms of particles. As such, it could be considered similar to
a law of nature. This claim is also perceived as mysterious: how can the wave function be a law of
nature if it is time dependent? This objection has been raised by many people (David Wallace, Peter
Lewis) and it has already been replied: Detlef, Nino and Shelly have a paper (“BM and the meaning of
the wave function”) and there is another one by Stefan Teufel and Shelly (“Quantum Spacetime without
Observers: Ontological Clarity and the Conceptual Foundations of Quantum Gravity”) in which they

explain how the timedependent Schroedinger equation can phenomenologically emerge from a future
theory of quantum cosmology in which the wave function is stationary, i.e. it is time independent. So ti
seems like the timedependency of psi is just a contingent matter, resting on the provisional nature of
quantum mechanics: while we will arrive to a more complete a satisfactory theory as quantum
cosmology we would not be having a timedependent wave function any longer.
Judging our projects unsatisfactory, Alyssa starts analyzing the project of the rival wave function
ontology view. As is clear, their main task is to “recover” the manifest image, and the claim of the
proponents is that they can do it being functionalists with respect to properties. Alyssa raises doubts
regarding the possibility of doing the same for space: if I understand her correctly, she says that if one is
a substantivalist with respect to space, this cannot work since functionally enacted space is just a
simulation. That is a very interesting consideration: if the fundamental space is R3N, it is not R3,
period, no matter you play with words, and any recovery of R3 will be just be illusory. Now, I wonder
how much this objection will impress the wave function realists: I think that David and Berry will be
just as happy with this as they were before: after all, they have already accepted that R3 is an illusion to
start with, and now, with their functionalist machinery, they have explain why we have this illusion, so
there is no surprise for them.
In any case, I think I have talked too much already, so I will thank Alyssa for the wonderful paper and I
will let the discussion begin!

